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IDEOLOGICAL PLURALISM AND GOVERNMENT
REGULATION OF PRIVATE MORALITY
RAYMOND B. MARCIN*
"You can't legislate morality!"-so says someone, somewhere every
day. It is our conventional wisdom. It is a truism that is often heard in
crassly political advocacy, and yet it both antedates and transcends
traditional American politics. It has often been used by both liberal
and conservative advocates. One recalls its use by President
Eisenhower in the Little Rock, Arkansas, school desegregation crisis in
the 1950's, as well as its use by more recent advocates of change in
anti-abortion laws. Today it is most often heard in contexts similar to
the subject of this symposium: laws prohibiting the dissemination of
obscene materials, homosexual acts, fornication, prostitution, and a
host of others the reader can doubtless supply.
What does the truism mean? Is it jurisprudentially demonstrable
that morality cannot be legislated into effect? It seems doubtful that
any such jurisprudential demonstration can be made. One recalls that
the civil rights struggle of the past generation, seen by most as a bat-
tle over minds and hearts and attitudes in a moral arena, was waged in
large part with legislative sanctions as prime weapons. It seems dif-
ficult, contrasting the interracial attitudes of a generation ago with
those of today, to avoid concluding that those legislative sanctions had
much to do with a profound moral change. It may not be inaccurate to
say that a morality of racial tolerance has to some extent at least been
legislated. What, then, does the truism mean?
An advocate who voices that truism usually does not intend to con-
vey the idea that the state cannot legislate morality. Examples of ef-
fective legislations of morality abound (along of course, with ineffective
attempts, such as alcohol prohibition laws). What the advocate usually
means is that the state has no moral right to criminally punish purely
private acts of immorality.' The advocate of the truism would argue
that, although the civil rights laws do indeed criminally (as well as
civilly) punish private acts of immorality, those acts are not purely
private. They involve harm to others. The state may, they would
argue, certainly legislate away that harm.
Some may pause at this point to conclude that the truism has been
resurrected. The doubt we cast upon it has been swept away, and its
validity is once again clear: a state may not legislate morality itself,
*Associate Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America. A.B., St. John's
Seminary; A.B., Fairfield University; J.D., Fordham.
1. H.L.A. Hart certainly recognized that as the question "ITihe question is one...
of morality. It is the question whether the enforcement of morality is morally justified."
H. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 17 (1963).
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but it may legislate against the harm to others occasioned by immorali-
ty. This more extended version of the truism perhaps is more
jurisprudentially accurate, but it too suffers from the simplicity of the
original. Despite the Civil Rights Act of 1964's technical hook-up with
harm to interstate commerce, it can scarcely be doubted that most, if
not all lawmakers who voted in favor of civil rights legislation did so
out of a moral posture and with an intent to end a moral outrage which
had long been and was then being committed on an entire race of our
citizenry. The harm and the morality are, in other words, inextricably
bound together. We seem forced to conclude that a more accurate ver-
sion of the truism is: a state may legislate morality itself as long as, in
doing so, it confines itself to removal of the harm to others occasioned
by present immorality.
This perhaps is the closest we can come to a statement of the con-
ventional (though not unanimous) Anglo-American wisdom. Two cen-
turies ago William Blackstone, with little analysis or development,
voiced the "gut-feeling" that many contemporary jurists have:
All crimes ought . . . to be estimated merely according to the
mischiefs which they produce in civil society: and of conse-
quence, private vices or the breach of mere absolute duties,
which man is bound to perform considered only as an in-
dividual, are not, cannot be, the object of any municipal law;
any farther than as by their evil example, or other pernicious
effects, they may prejudice the community, and thereby
become a species of public crimes.2
There is, of course, a counterview to this conventional liber-
tarianism. The counterpoint to libertarianism is usually referred to as
paternalism. The paternalist's thesis is that the state may legitimately
interfere with an individual's liberty of action for reasons having solely
to do with that individual's own good. Paternalism writ large is, of
course, Orwell's 1984 big-brotherism, but lest visions of paternalistic
excess send us scurrying too far in the other direction, we ought to
note that its total jettisoning would take over the side with it man-
datory minimum-wage laws, mandatory maximum-hours laws, and com-
pulsory time-and-a-half-for-overtime laws. Somewhere there may be a
totally consistent libertarian and somewhere (else, it is hoped) a totally
consistent paternalist, but most of us probably fall somewhere in be-
tween. Consequently most of us are saddled with the discomfort of in-
consistency.
2. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 40. As with many a conventional wisdom,
however, Blackstone's view was probably more honored in the breach than in the obser-
vance, for he himself elsewhere noted the propriety of criminally punishing various forms
of sodomy. Id at *215, *241.
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How, then, do we go about trying to answer the question we have
posed? How, then, can we assess whether the state has a moral right
to legislate morality? The question itself is one of morality-of ethics.
When is it ethical for a state to criminally punish acts which it believes
to be immoral solely for that reason? Whenever, we, or a majority of
us are in agreement with that belief? There may be some logic to the
statement that a state may morally do whatever a majority of its
members believe is moral, but tyranny of the majority is hardly a
satisfactory solution to the problems and sensibilities of minority
members. No, what is needed is a moral criterion itself-an ethical
standard-by which we can assess the moral propriety of a state's
decision to act in a moral context.
With confident vigor, John Stuart Mill, the quintessential English
libertarian of a century ago, provided an ethical standard of sorts
which has controlled debate on state morality regulation ever since:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually
or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any
of their number, is self-protection .... [T]he only purpose for
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of
a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a suffi-
cient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or
forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it
will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to
do so would be wise, or even right.8
In Mill's ethical standard, the sovereign of individual human liberty
looms large indeed. Under his formula of "harm to others" it bows only
to a co-equal sovereign. Within its own domain, where it touches none
other, the sovereign is supreme. The free development of the in-
dividual human personality may be interfered with but only to prevent
harm to others.
Mill's ethical standard of liberty and harm is so compelling in its
simplicity that it seems to have been presumed by both proponents and
opponents of anti-obscenity legislation-indeed it seems to have been
assumed by Mill's critics as well as his friends.4 Yet, as attractive as the
3. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 1 (1859), reprinted in THE Six GREAT HUMANISTIC
ESSAYS OF JOHN STUART MILL 135 (1963).
4. Mill's principal 20th century critic, Lord Patrick Devlin, whose arguments
(discussed more fully infra) focus on social harm and social self-defense, certainly accepts
it. But Mill's contemporary Sir James Fitzjames Stephen did dismiss the Mill ethical stan-
dard: "To me, the question of whether liberty is a good or a bad thing appears as irra-
tional as the question whether fire is a good or a bad thing. It is both good and bad accord-
ing to time, place and circumstance." J. STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 48
(1973).
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Mill criterion is, it is certainly not the only plausible approach to deci-
sions as to the propriety of state activity in the moral sphere. Others who
prize individual human liberty may not have assigned that factor as high
a priority as Mill did or may view competing considerations as of equal
importance. Mill's own contemporary, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, sug-
gested a criterion for state action which was, if anything, more faithfully
utilitarian than that of Mill, a balance not between liberty and harm, but
between goodness and convenience: "If... the object aimed at is good, if
the compulsion employed such as to attain it, and if the good obtained
overbalances the inconvenience of the compulsion itself, I do not under-
stand how, upon utilitarian principles, the compulsion can be bad."5 It is
seen at once that Stephen's ethical standard has two problems: it permits
an alarmingly large degree of state paternalism and it begs the question
somewhat. How are we to judge the moral propriety of the state's deci-
sion that a particular end or object is good?
Withal, Mill's balancing of liberty and harm and Stephen's balanc-
ing of goodness and inconvenience seem to be the polar criteria. How
much relative importance one assigns to individual human liberty on
the one hand and to social or individual good as one perceives it on the
other will determine one's judgment as to the ethical propriety of the
state's using its compulsive power to restrain obscenity, homosexuali-
ty, fornication, and the like. The views of two commentators in par-
ticular serve as fitting examples.
Lord Patrick Devlin entered the law and morality fray in the late
1950's in response to the recommendation of a legislative committee in
England that homosexual practices in private between consenting
adults should no longer be crimes. Devlin, a mild Millian libertarian at
the time, had supported the report's recommendation and the Mill
ethical standard on which it was based. But then Devlin, a year after
the report was issued, was called upon to deliver the second Mac-
cabaean Lecture in Jurisprudence of the British Academy. It was in
the course of preparing for that lecture that he became persuaded by
study that the legislative committee's recommendation was wrong. The
result was a defense of the propriety of state criminal sanctions
against private immorality. Devlin had not read Stephen's attack on
the Millian methaethic at the time, but on reading it later, he declared
his own views to be remarkably in accord with Stephen's. Curiously,
however, Devlin, although totally in accord with Stephen's result,
seemed much more in accord with Mill in the use of an ethical stan-
dard. Devlin seemed to wish to tackle Mill on his own field, that is, the
harm-to-others criterion. Even private acts of immorality harm others
5. Id. at 50.
6. P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS vii (1965).
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in the sense that and insofar as they "are capable in their nature of
threatening the existence of society ... ." This is so because a society
is not only made up of a community of political ideas but of a communi-
ty of moral ideas as well. Consequently, although admittedly not every
deviation from society's shared morals threatens its existence, every
such deviation is at least capable of such a threat, and so cannot be put
beyond the law.8
Devlin did have a quarrel with the degree of importance Mill at-
tached to individual liberty, and in that sense he was in accord with
Stephen:
Mill believed that diversity in morals and the removal of
restraint on what was traditionally held to be immorality
would liberate men to prove what they thought to be good
... .He conceived of an old morality being replaced by a
new and perhaps better morality .... But he did not really
grapple with the fact that along the paths that depart from
traditional morals, pimps leading the weak astray far out-
number spiritual explorers at the head of the strong
Devlin's critique of Mill was quickly answered by Oxford's H.L.A.
Hart. Hart found what he felt were major weaknesses in Devlin's
"threat-to-society" justification for morality regulation. While a
"consensus of moral opinion on certain matters is essential if society is
to be worth living in," nonetheless "we have ample evidence for believ-
ing that people will not abandon morality, will not think any better of
7. Id at 13, n.1.
8. Id. Devlin's thesis concerning the potential social harm of private acts of im-
morality has its analogues in other contexts. One such involves the federal commerce
power. The criterion of propriety for the federal commerce power is that the federal
government has no constitutional right to regulate any commerce save interstate com-
merce or commerce having a substantial effect on interstate commerce. In Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the United States Supreme Court sustained Congress' exten-
sion of federal regulation to farm production not intended in any part for interstate com-
merce but wholly for purely private consumption on the farm. The Court agreed that the
impact of the home grown and home consumed wheat in question on interstate commerce
was trivial, but noted that trivial impact could become substantial when taken with
many others similarly situated. It is this very phenomenon that Devlin seems to portray.
Certainly, the doings of two lone homosexuals in private do not threaten society. But
multiply those two and the effect of them on the moral tone of society in terms of the ac-
ceptability of homosexual practices can be substantial. Further multiply that effect by
reason of the state's adopting the view that such conduct is beyond its concern and we
have a potential threat to the existence of that society. Whether that threat, if realized.
would lead to a morally good society with an increase in social tolerance and understand-
ing or to a morally evil society with lustful debauchery commonplace is beyond the scope
of this paper.
9. Id at 108.
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murder, cruelty, and dishonesty, merely because some private sexual
practice which they abominate is not punished by the law."1 Hart, hav-
ing doubted the premise of Devlin's "threat-to-society" argument went
on to assume arguendo that the threat was real. If it were it would not
lead to "the overthrow of ordered government, but a peaceful change
in its form."'"
Perhaps Hart's strongest contribution to the libertarian side of the
argument was his deft introduction of a burden-of-justification issue.
Devlin seemed to have assumed that if a state does see fit to regulate
morality, opponents must, if they are to prevail, convince the legal
community of the impropriety of the state's action. Not so, said Hart.
The state, when it criminally punishes offenders, is doing "things
which, if they are not justified as sanctions, are delicts or wrongs." 2 In
addition, "[T]he use of legal coercion by any society calls for justifica-
tion as something prima facie objectionable to be tolerated only for the
sake of some countervailing good."'" If jurisprudence accepts Hart's
burden-of-justification argument,"' then Devlin and Stephen's position
is in grave jeopardy. As should be evident by now, the arguments sup-
porting both the paternalist and the libertarian positions are logical,
and whether one views either as being sound and persuasive will prob-
ably depend on whether one views humankind as the fallible victim of
original sin or as the nobly evolving master of its own destiny. If the
views of some of us fall in between those two extremes, we may find
neither position totally persuasive and perhaps both totally sound-the
discomfort of inconsistency. Yet if paternalism must measure itself
against libertarianism and establish not merely its soundness but its
superiority whenever it wishes to criminally sanction immoral conduct,
then it is almost certainly fighting a losing battle.
Hart's rhetorical victory, however, if that is what it is, hardly ends
the dispute. On the contrary, it merely serves to refocus attention, this
time more specifically on the nature of the moral question at hand. The
problem is one of justification. How does the libertarian or the pater-
nalist go about convincing us that his or her position is justified, or
more justified than the other? The question suggests the need of a
two-pronged answer. First, to justify implies an appeal to justice. An
10. H. HART, IMMORALITY AND TREASON, reprinted in MORALITY AND THE LAW 53 (R.
Wasserstrom 1971),
11. id.
12. H. HART, supra note 1, at 21.
13. Id. at 20.
14. Ronald Dworkin, H.L.A. Hart's successor at Oxford, has certainly accepted
Hart's burden-of-justification argument and has used it to suggest and relentlessly
destroy what he felt were all possible justifications for Devlin's position. See Dworkin,
Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L. J. 986 (1966).
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advocate and an audience must have a unified concept of what justice
is for an appeal to justice to have its proper effect. Secondly, to justify
implies the use of a process, that of justification. Similarly, an advocate
and an audience must have a unified concept of the process of justifica-
tion for its use to have its proper effect. The trouble, as we shall see,
is the lack in our society of an unified concept either of justice or of
justification.
1. Justice. What is justice? Is it something which functions as a
standard for law, a norm by which law is to be measured and ex-
pressed? If it is a standard or a norm, we must then describe its con-
tent. Is it a norm of suitability, that being the inherent suitability of
the various relationships prescribed by laws? If so, suitability for
what? For the improvement of the human condition? For workability?
For utility? For order? For the development of the human potential?
If justice is a norm or standard, is it a pre-established norm or
standard? Does it antedate the laws which it judges? Or does it
possibily derive some or all of its content from those laws? Is justice
nothing more than the existential actuality which laws acquire? Is con-
stitutionality the ultimate content of justice, as Hans Kelsen seems to
suppose?" Is there an "ultrastandard" of justice beyond a nation's
written constitution? Anglo-American common law can be viewed as an
effectuation of that "ultrastandard," as perhaps can contemporary
judicial appeals to "public policy." But if there is an "ultrastandard,"
what is it? Some have seen it in a philosophical analysis of the nature
of the human being."6 Some, agreeing, saw an "ultra-ultrastandard" in
the divine essence. 7 Others would find justice's ultimate existential
reality in sociology or in psychoanalytic theory.18 The reader can,
perhaps, supply even more versions of ultranorms.
We are a pluralist society, not merely ethnically, but also
philosophically and idealistically. We differ in our concepts of the
nature of humankind, the meaning of human existence, and the point of
human relationships. As long as we continue to differ, we will have to
content ourselves with what might be called "adjectival justice." It is, as
15. H. KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW (1970). Kelsen's theory is that laws
derive their legitimacy (are justified?) from superior laws which serve as norms. Above all
subsidiary and intermediate norms exists the "grundnorm" or basic norm. Either the
basic norm is seen as needing no justification or a quest for its ultranorm is seen as
useless or impossible. Kelsen's basic norm is, of course, the will of a monarch in council or
a written constitution. His refusal to go beyond that norm, while heavily criticized by
some, is perhaps a quite realistic recognition by him of the basic point of our discussion:
beyond the grundnorm, pluralist ideas of the nature of humankind and human relation-
ships make agreement on the content of justice impossible.
16. The natural law theory. See, e.g., B. BROWN, THE NATURAL LAW READER (1960).
17. See, e.g., T. AQUINAS. SUMMA THEOLOGIAE. TREATISE ON LAW q. 90-97 (1970).
18. A. EHRENZWEIG, PSYCHOANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1971).
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Kelsen perhaps thought, pointless to appeal to one single ultimate con-
cept of justice. We appeal, instead, to social justice, individual justice,
natural justice, existential justice, distributive justice, and compen-
satory justice.19 This phenomenon of adjectival justice caused by
philosophical pluralism was noticed by three German theologians amid
the chaos which burdened western Europe in the decade after World
War II:
The special cause for alarm comes into view when it appears
that the same thing can be legitimized at one point and deemed
utterly illegal at another. There is little disquiet about this ex-
treme relativity of law because justice is now generally regarded
as "une opinion de rhomme," something which has to be
qualified and reinforced by an adjective (e.g. 'social' justice) or
evaluated as 'bourgeois' justice, 'British' justice, and even (if
one is not careful) 'Christian' justice. Justice thus relativized
and degraded, cannot be taken seriously as a basis for law. And
law, in its turn, begins to lose its direct connection with the
truth of human existence.'
The theologians' immediate fear had to do with the possibility of this
flawed, adjectival "justice" leading to more totalitarian excesses. Ap-
peals to "justice" become rhetorical devices, and justice is just another
means to another end.
Given this cultural and philosophic pluralism and the consequent
relativism of our concepts of justice, it may not be. a copout to suggest
that the question of a unified concept of justice must be a theological
one, and further given our religious, nonreligious, and antireligious
pluralism, an unresolvable one. Unresolvable though the question may
be on the social level, the quest for its solution does provide a
framework for individual decisions as to the propriety of morality
regulation in a more healthy, tolerant setting. Each of us predictably
believes his or her concept of justice to be the correct one, but this
recognition of our pluralism cannot but serve to blunt the tendency to
regard one's own view as infallible.
2. Justification. The thought that the elusiveness of a unified con-
cept of justice can perhaps be overcome by a unanimity of approach in
19. Perhaps a clear contemporary example of this phenomenon is the "benign"
racial preference or reverse discrimination debate. Advocates of special treatment for
minority-group applicants for employment or graduate school positions typically argue
social justice, whereas opponents of that special treatment typically argue individual
justice. This, of course, suggests that, empirically at least, the ultimate norm is the will of
any five justices of the United States Supreme Court.
20. H. SCHREY. H. WALZ, & W. WHITEHOUSE, THE BIBLICAL DOCTRINE OF JUSTICE
AND LAW 22 (1955).
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the process of justification, however attractive, is as one might
suspect, naive. The dilemma caused by philosophical pluralism has in-
fected the approaches we use in making ethical decisions as well. We
are not in agreement at all on how to justify. Two great decisional
modes, the deontological and the teleological, with their numerous
derivatives, insure that persons trying to decide on the moral proprie-
ty of morality regulation will not even agree on a method of justifying.
Deonotological modes judge a measure on the basis of its intrinsic
nature. Certain phenomena are seen as intrinsically evil, for example,
lying and cheating. Teleological modes judge a measure on the basis of
its end, its final cause, its consequences. Certain actions which a deon-
tological ethicist might regard as evil can be justified by the
teleological ethicist, for example, lying to save a life. Further sub-
categorizations of these schools of thought abound." One whose basic
ethical orientation is deontological will obviously have little difficulty
justifying the regulating of acts Which are understood as intrinsically
immoral. One whose basic ethical orientation is teleological will prob-
ably experience great difficulty in conceiving a statute which satisfac-
torily covers such topics as obscenity or homosexual acts from an end
or consequences perspective. That the two ethicists could ever come to
an agreement on the question seems a ridiculously sanguine hope.'
Beyond the two great ethical decisional modes lie the great
theories of justification. They too have a determining effect on how we
decide. Some may prefer the natural-law theory. It can be seen as giv-
ing the deontologist a frame of reference for decisions as to intrinsic
moral worth. But within that great school of jurisprudence, will one
prefer the theistic approach of Saint Thomas Aquinas,' the rationalist
approach of Cicero and Hugo Grotius, 4 the procedural natural-law ap-
proach of Lon Fuller?" Others may be positivist in orientation." Still
others may eschew all forms of natural-law jurisprudence and the
classical forms of positivism, and view themselves as legal realists.'
21. See W. FRANKENA. ETHICS (1973).
22. One commentator, however, may have provided the groundwork for an even-
tual agreement. Virginia Held, writing in ETHICS, has argued that the deontological ap-
proach seems more appropriate to legal decisions, the teleological to political decisions.
Held, Justification: Legal and Political, 86 ETHICS: INT'L J. SOC. POL. & LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 1
(1975). Whether to enact an anti-obscenity law is, of course, a political question.
23. See, e.g., T. AQUINAS, supra note 17.
24. See, e.g., H. GROTIUS. DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIS (Classics of International Law
ed. 1925).
25. See, e.g., L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1969).
26. See, e.g., J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832); J.
BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES AND MORALS OF LEGISLATION (Hafner ed. 1948).
27. See, e.g., Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457 (1897).
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Within those great traditions will one's approach be utilitarian," social-
contract,2 or some other? If social-contract, will it be Rousseauian' or
Rawlsian?8'
CONCLUSION
There is a purpose to the just concluded inundation of the reader.
It is to soften the apparent cynicism of the writer's conclusion that the
grand debate between the libertarian and the paternalist over the
moral propriety of regulating morality may well be unresolvable on
the philosophical level. Our ideological pluralism will easily justify the
position of each ten times over. That is not, however, to say that the
grand debate is unresolvable on other levels. In the realistic world of
power politics, it is easily resolved in the ayes and nays of the
legislative assembly. That solution may seem question-begging and
therefore simplistic. But it is in the social process of enacting, enforc-
ing, and then rethinking laws that the natural process of consensus form-
ation occurs. If ideological pluralism disables philosophy as a resolving
agent, then naught is left but the established legislative process and
the march of human events. Perhaps it is that very paralysis of
modern philosophical pluralism that saves us from the anarchy of ab-
solute libertarianism and the slavery of absolute paternalism, and that
serves as the trump card for those who hope that neither side wins the
debate outright.
28. See, e.g., J. BENTHAM. supra note 26.
29. See, e.g., Symposium, John Rawls's, A Theory of Justice, 40 U. CHI. L. REV.
486 (1973).
30. See, e.g., J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES (1950).
31. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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